MDSec Shows ServiceNow Hijack Paths in Red Team Simulations

How do attackers gain an initial foothold in ServiceNow?

MDSec’s red‑team simulations demonstrate that attackers can hijack ServiceNow instances, gain privileged access, and use the platform to move laterally across an organization, all while remaining largely invisible to traditional security controls by exploiting mis‑configurations, insecure APIs, and over‑privileged roles that many enterprises overlook.

First, the team identified publicly exposed ServiceNow endpoints that lack proper authentication throttling. Because ServiceNow often serves as a central ITSM hub, its APIs are reachable from the internet for legitimate integrations. When rate‑limits are weak, credential‑stuffing or token‑replay attacks become feasible (MDSec report).

Second, attackers leverage default admin accounts or accounts with broad role assignments that were never trimmed after onboarding. In several engagements, MDSec found that service accounts retained the "admin" role long after their original purpose ended, providing a shortcut to full platform control.

Finally, the team exploited insecure third‑party plugins that expose additional ServiceNow tables without proper ACLs. These plugins, often installed for convenience, inadvertently grant read/write access to critical configuration objects.

What privileged actions can be performed once inside ServiceNow?

Once inside, the adversary can manipulate ServiceNow’s workflow engine to execute arbitrary scripts on connected systems. MDSec demonstrated the use of “Script Includes” to run PowerShell commands on on‑premise Windows servers that communicate with ServiceNow via the IntegrationHub (MDSec findings).

Attackers can also create forged incidents that trigger automated remediation actions, effectively turning defensive automation into an attack vector. By altering the “Assignment Group” field, they can redirect tickets to malicious endpoints, exfiltrating data under the guise of normal workflow.

Another powerful capability is the ability to provision new user accounts with high‑privilege roles, enabling persistence beyond the initial breach. MDSec observed that newly created admin accounts remained active even after the original compromised credentials were revoked, illustrating a classic “backdoor” within the platform.

Because ServiceNow logs are often centralized in SIEMs, malicious activity can blend with legitimate administrative noise, making detection challenging without focused query rules.

How can defenders detect and prevent ServiceNow compromise?

Detection starts with tightening the attack surface. Organizations should audit every ServiceNow role assignment, removing unnecessary admin rights and applying the principle of least privilege (MDSec guidance).

Network‑level controls are essential: restrict inbound traffic to ServiceNow APIs to known IP ranges, enforce multi‑factor authentication for all privileged accounts, and enable rate‑limiting on authentication endpoints.

Implement continuous monitoring of ServiceNow’s audit logs. Specific queries to flag creation of new admin users, changes to ACLs, or the use of Script Includes that invoke external commands can surface suspicious behavior early.

Regularly review third‑party plugins and remove any that are not actively used. For required plugins, verify that they respect ServiceNow’s native ACL model and do not expose additional tables to unauthenticated callers.

Finally, integrate ServiceNow with a dedicated cloud security posture management (CSPM) tool that can automatically detect mis‑configurations and recommend remediation steps.

What does this mean for you?

ServiceNow is no longer just a ticketing system; it can serve as a stealthy command‑and‑control hub if left unchecked. Organizations should treat the platform with the same rigor applied to critical infrastructure, conducting regular role reviews, hardening API exposure, and deploying focused log analytics. By shrinking the attack surface and adding visibility, you reduce the chance that a red‑team technique becomes a real‑world breach.

Frequently asked questions

Can ServiceNow be compromised without a phishing attack?

Yes, attackers can exploit weak API authentication, over‑privileged service accounts, or insecure plugins to gain access without relying on phishing.

What is the most effective way to limit privileged access in ServiceNow?

Apply the principle of least privilege by regularly reviewing role assignments, removing unnecessary admin rights, and enforcing MFA for all privileged users.

How can I detect malicious scripts running inside ServiceNow?

Monitor audit logs for creation or modification of Script Includes that execute external commands, and set up alerts for unusual script activity.

Should I block all external traffic to ServiceNow APIs?

Instead of a blanket block, restrict API access to known IP ranges, enforce rate‑limiting, and require strong authentication to reduce exposure.

Is a third‑party CSPM tool necessary for ServiceNow security?

A CSPM can automate detection of mis‑configurations and enforce best‑practice policies, making it a valuable addition to manual security processes.